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MARIA V. ANTOKOLSKAIA"
I. INTRODUCTION
As a result of the political changes in Russia, a comprehensive revision
of the whole field of private law has begun. Part of this process was the 1995
adoption of the new Russian Family Code.' Work on the draft began in June
1994,2 and the Code came into force on March 1, 1996. At the same time,
Russia adopted the first part of its new Civil Code.' Certain aspects of the
new Russian Family Code may be of interest to the western public because
the Code tries to solve several recent problems that are also issues in many
Western countries. Among other items, the Family Code contains new provi-
sions regarding artificial insemination, surrogate motherhood, and genetic
testing.' Furthermore, there is a new chapter on children's rights based on
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1990 (Child
Convention).'
The new Russian Family Code may be of interest to western lawyers
because the Code's drafters consistently intended to switch to a rights-based
approach rather than a paternalistic approach. Furthermore, the drafters at-
* Senior Research fellow of the Molengraaff Institute of Private Law, University of
Utrecht, The Netherlands. Until 1998, Associate Professor of Moscow State Law Academy,
member of the drafting commission of the new Russian Family Code.
1. CODE FAM. [C. FAM.] (Russ.). See Semeiniy Kodeks Rossiiskoy Federatsii, (1995)
(Russ.). Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoy Federatsii 1996 No. 1, item 15. For English
translation, see WILLIAM E. BUTLER & JANE E. HENDERSON, RUSSIAN LEGAL TEXTS: THE
FOUNDATION OF A RuLE-OF-LAW STATE AND A MARKET ECONOMY 517-93 (Simmons and Hill
Publishing 1998).
2. The drafting commission was formed by Komitet Po Delam Zhenshchin, Sem'i i
Molodezhi Gosudarstvennoy Dumy Rossiiskoy Federatsii [the Committee on Women, Fam-
ily, and Youth Affairs of the State Duma of the Russian Federation] and consisted of six fam-
ily law scholars.
3. CODE CIVIL [C. CIv.] (Russ.) [hereinafter 1994 C. crv.] This first part was adopted on
October 21, 1994 and came into force on January 1, 1995. See Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva
Rossiiskoy Federatsii, No. 32 item 3302 (1994) (Russ.). For English translation of the Civil
Code, see 21 REVIEW OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN LAW 245-430 (1995).
4. See C. FAM. art. 51(4).
5. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), 28 I.L.M.1448 (1989)
[hereinafter Child Convention].
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tempted to limit the amount of state interference in family matters.' The new
Family Code may be more uniquely interesting than the new Russian Civil
Code because, even before its revision, Russian family law was, in some as-
pects, more modem than the laws in many other European countries. In con-
trast to the Family Code, Russian civil law, due to the peculiarities of Rus-
sian post-revolutionary history, was outdated and undeveloped. The new
Russian Civil Code was drafted to overcome these peculiarities.
Russian family law has a modem character because the global revision
of family law that has developed over the last seventy-five years in most
European countries was already complete in Russia by 1918.' By that time,
all feudal and ecclesiastical rules of the Russian Empire were replaced by
secular rules that were very modem for that time. Those modernized rules
introduced civil marriage and civil no-fault based divorce. Moreover, the
rules gave women equal rights in family relations and, among other things,
provided equal rights to illegitimate children. The liberal period under these
modernized rules was followed by a period of severe reaction, starting in
1944.8 This period lasted until 1969, when progressive development contin-
ued, and the Code on Marriage and Family was adopted.9
II. WHY IS THE NEW RUSSIAN FAMILY CODE A SEPARATE CODE?
Before the Russian Revolution of 1917, family law was considered to be
a part of civil law. Accordingly, family legislation was also part of civil leg-
islation."° In 1918, immediately after the Revolution, the first separate Rus-
sian Family Code was adopted. At that time, Russia had hardly any civil law
6. The antagonism of paternalism and individual rights in the area of family law is still
an issue in Western Europe. The extent of this antagonism is illustrated by the so-called Criti-
cal Theory of Family Law as elaborated in Britain in the Eighties. See Michael D.A. Freeman,
Towards a Critical Theory of Family Law, CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 153 (1985);
KATHERINE O' DONOVAN, SEXUAL DivisioNs IN LAW (Weidenfeld & Nicholson eds., 1985).
7. See Kodeks Zakonov ob Aktah Grazhdanskogo Sostoianiia, Brachnom, Semeinom i
Opekunskom Prave, No. 76, item 818 SU RSFSR 1918 (1918). This revision was almost fin-
ished in 1918 when the first Russian Family Code, the Code of Statutes on Civil Acts, Mar-
riage, Family, and Custody Law, was adopted.
8. See Ukaz Prezidiuma Verhovnogo Soveta SSSR, Ved. SSSP 1944 No. 37 (1944)
(Russ.) [hereinafter Ukaz Prezidiuma]. In 1944, Russian family law was turned 180 degrees.
The infamous Ukaz [Decree] of July 8, 1944 radically revoked several important previous innova-
tions of family law. Informal marriage lost legal status. The recognition of children born out of
wedlock, the establishment of paternity by the courts, and even the maintenance of claims on be-
half of a natural child were all rendered no longer possible. Even pre-revolutionary legislation had
been less harsh in this respect. Divorce proceedings became complicated and expensive; only fol-
lowing the second hearing were the courts entitled to grant a divorce when they found that a mar-
riage had irreversibly broken down.
9. See Kodeks Zakonov o Brake i Sem'ie RSFSR, Ved. RSFSR, 1969, No. 32, item 1086
(1969) (Russ.).
10. See Svod Zakonov Rossiiskoy Imperii (Russ.). This is a Collection of Statutes of the
Russian Empire where family law statutes were placed together with other civil statutes in the
second part of volume X.
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acts to be regulated. The new Russian government abolished all pre-
revolutionary civil acts. Practically all property was nationalized, and almost
all civil transactions were forbidden. Administrative distribution replaced
civil transactional turnovers. Civil law was proudly proclaimed dead, and no
one intended to revive it. Family relations, however, still needed to be regu-
lated. Wanting to roll back the influence of the Church in this sphere, the
new Soviet State was eager to replace pre-revolutionary family law. The So-
viet State's desire to limit the Church's influence made it completely logical
to adopt an exclusive family law code. Furthermore, this desire explains why
the separation of civil and family law was not discussed at the time. Actu-
ally, family law did not separate from the Civil Code; it merely continued to
exist while civil law was all but abolished.
Initially, the separation was only a matter of legislation. Family law was
still considered to be part of civil law. This changed only when ideology
penetrated legal theory. The concept of family law as an independent branch
of law was based on the assumption that "socialist" family law was totally
different from "capitalist" family law. "Capitalist" family law was deemed
to be part of civil law because, in a capitalist society, property relations were
thought to constitute the largest and most important part of family life. Mar-
riage was even defined as a civil contract. At the same time, the "socialist"
family was supposed to consist of mainly cost-free personal relations devoid
of any material considerations.1" The concept of independence of family law
became predominant in the fifties and remained almost untouched until the
time of the drafting of the new Family Code. Contemporary supporters of
the independence of family law are essentially advocating the same argu-
ments in favor of the fundamental difference between family and civil rela-
tions, omitting only the most notorious ideological clich6s.
With family law separate from civil law, the courts encountered enor-
mous problems because civil legislation was deemed inapplicable to family
relations." In practice, this doctrine was never fully implemented because
family law lacked important provisions and concepts, such as the concept of
contract and the rules on the fulfillment of obligations. In reality, courts ap-
plied civil legislation in family cases but did not expressly refer to the Civil
Code.
Persistently resistant to a merger, the majority of Russian family law
experts made it unfeasible to incorporate family law into the new Civil
Code. Hence, the new Civil Code does not have a special provision on the
application of civil law to family relations, but it does contain a general defi-
nition of the relations governed by civil law. 3 Civil law governs property
11. See S.I. Paevich, Brachnoe i Semeinoe Pravo, in OSNOVY SOVETSKOGO PRAVA 420
(Dmitrii Mazherovskii ed., 1927).
12. Article 2 of the previous Civil Code stated that family relations were regulated exclu-
sively by family law rules and civil law rules could be applied only when family law rules
explicitly refer to them. See C. civ. art. 2 (1964) (Russ.).
13. See 1994 C. civ. art. 2(1).
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and, among other matters, the personal non-property relations connected to
property."' These relationships rely on equality, autonomy of will, and prop-
erty independence of the participants of those relations."5 Family relations fit
all these features. Therefore, it is not improper to conclude that civil law also
governs family relations.
The drafters of the Family Code went one step further. According to Ar-
ticle 4 of the Family Code, civil law is applicable to all family relations that
remain undetermined by provisions of family law "as far as this is not incon-
sistent with the nature of family relations."' 6 Hence, civil law rules can be as
widely applied to family relations as reasonably possible.
As suggested in the commentary to the Family Code, 7 the application of
civil law rules to family relations can be approached as a correlation between
general rules (the Civil Code) and specific rules (the Family Code). Certain
provisions of the Civil Code and the Family Code on marriage property il-
lustrate this concept. For instance, Article 256 of the Civil Code contains
general provisions relating to legal and contractual regimes 8 while certain
chapters of the Family Code regulate, in detail, the legal regime of matrimo-
nial property and the entry into, the content, dissolution, and annulment of
marriage contracts.19
III. NEW SUBSTANTIVE LAW: SOME IMPORTANT CHANGES
A. Marriage and Divorce Law
In pre-revolutionary Russia civil marriage and divorce did not exist. The
population was subordinated to the ecclesiastical rules of different religions.
Civil marriage was not introduced until 1917.2' After that time, only civil
solemnized marriages had legal consequences.
In 1926, long-term cohabitation without marriage acquired virtually the
same legal status as formal marriage.2' This change was perceived as the first
step towards the final "dying out of marriage" which, according to the fash-
ionable theory of that time, was supposed to occur in a communist society.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. Id. art. 4(1).
17. See KOMMENTARII K SEMEINOMU KODEKSU RosSIISKoY FEDERATSII 33-35 (Irina. M.
Kuznetsova ed., Moscow, 2000). The commentary was written by the members of the draft
team. The author was a member of the draft team.
18. See 1994 C. civ. art. 256.
19. See C. FAM. chs. 7-8.
20. See 0 Grazhdanskom Brake, Detiah i Vedenii Knig Aktov Grazhdanskogo
Sostoianiia, SU SSSR 1917 No 1, item 160 (1917) (Russ.) (Decree of the Russian Central Ex-
ecutive Committee and the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR).
21. See Kodeks Zakonov o Brake, Sem'e, i Opeke, SU RSFSR 1926 No 82, item 611
(1926) (Russ.).
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In 1944, informal marriage lost its legal significance." Furthermore, in-
formal marriage was not recognized by the subsequent Code on Marriage
and Family of 1969.
Regrettably, the new Family Code brought no change to this area. De-
spite the growing popularity of informal marriage, cohabitants do not ac-
quire any spousal rights with respect to property division in separation, ali-
mony, or inheritance cases. Due to the restrictive provisions of Article
244(3) of the Civil Code,23 cohabitants cannot unilaterally elect to hold their
property as community property.
Marriage is possible only for persons of opposite gender. This rule pre-
cludes informal same-gender unions from being accorded marital status. The
general belief is that this approach will not change significantly in the fore-
seeable future.
Under the new Family Code, a valid marriage requires the consent of
both spouses who must be at or above the age of majority. In Russia, major-
ity is reached at the age of eighteen, however, for marriage, the requirement
is variable up to two years.14 The new Family Code includes other legal im-
pediments to marriage. These include the existence of another registered
marriage, relationships between people related by a prohibited degree of
blood, and court-declared legal incapacity due to a mental disorder. 5 More-
over, the new Family Code prohibits marriage between a parent and an
adopted child; however, if the adoption is terminated, the marriage can be
solemnized.
As mentioned, the Russian Empire had no secular rules on divorce prior
to the Revolution. As a result, divorce was not open to all religious convic-
tions. Civil divorce procedure only became possible in 1917.26 The irreversi-
ble breakdown of marriage was the only possible legal ground for divorce.
When both spouses mutually agreed to divorce, they could register it in the
Department of Registration of Civil Acts. 7 If one spouse did not consent, the
divorce-seeking spouse had to resort to a procedure before the court.
In 1926, divorce procedure was simplified even more. At that point, a
person's mere unilateral intent was sufficient to terminate the marriage. In
1944, however, divorce became very difficult again. Spouses had to present
sufficient evidence of the irreversible breakdown of their marriage. Further-
more, the court could dismiss a divorce petition even if both spouses favored
divorce. These measures were intended to protect the stability of the family.
22. See Ukaz Prezidiuma, supra note 8.
23. See 1994 C. civ. art. 244(3) (According to this article, community property can be
created only by statute or by an explicit statutory authorization, and not on the basis of the
general freedom of contract.).
24. See C. FAM. art. 13(2).
25. See id. art. 14.
26. See 0 Rastorzhenii Braka, SU SSSR 1917 No. 10, item 154 (1917) (Russ.).
27. See Kodeks Zakonov ob Aktah Grazhdanskogo Sostoianiia, Brachnom, Semeinom i
Opekynskom Prave, arts. 85-99, SU RSFSR 1918 No. 76 item 818 (1918) (Russ.).
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In practice, they only achieved an increase in de-facto divorces and de-facto
remarriages.
The Family Code of 1969 once again made divorce more feasible. Al-
though the irreversible breakdown of marriage remained the general ground
for divorce, spouses were not obliged to present any proof of such break-
down in the administrative procedure. Irreversible breakdown was presup-
posed. In the court procedure, however, irreversible breakdown of marriage
still had to be proven. As before, the court could dismiss a divorce petition,
even against the wishes of both spouses, if the judge considered the reasons
for divorce insufficient. This was an example of pure paternalism. The State
claimed the right to keep the spouses in their marriage against their will, sac-
rificing their interests to the transpersonal goal of protecting the stability of
the family."
The new Family Code rejects the transpersonal and paternalistic view
that a judge can decide better than spouses themselves which reasons are
sufficient for dissolution of their marriage. The new Code seeks to diminish
State intervention in the private lives of spouses as much as possible. Al-
though the administrative procedure remains almost the same, the court pro-
cedure changed significantly. Under Article 22 of the Family Code, the court
should "dissolve the marriage without disclosing the reasons for divorce."'9
In addition, a judge can no longer suspend divorce, refuse to grant it, or even
examine the motivation for divorce." In fact, the courts are now competent
to hear cases only in two limited situations: first, where there are minor chil-
dren involved, and second, where there is no mutual consent to divorce.
In the first case, although the spouses agree to divorce, the matter still
goes before the court to ensure that the interests of the minor children are
protected. The court must approve any arrangements involving children.
The second situation where a court hearing is required is when one of
the spouses wants the marriage to continue. According to Article 22 of the
Family Code, "marriage has to be dissolved if it is proven that further family
life of the spouses is not possible."3 As before, divorce requires proof of the
irreversible breakdown of the marriage. However, this requirement is satis-
fied in a quite different way. The court cannot oblige the spouses to disclose
their reasons for or against divorce. If the spouses do not want to discuss
their private life in court, the judge's only recourse, according to Article
22(2), is to postpone divorce for up to three months to give them time to rec-
28. It is notable that, in spite of all the dramatic changes that took place in Russian di-
vorce legislation, the available data on the number of divorces shows almost no fluctuations.
The divorce rate in 1938-39 was 4.8 per thousand. In 1958-59 it was the same. While the Ukaz
[decree] of 1944 was in force, it actually increased to 5.3 per thousand instead. See H. Willekens
& S. Scherbov, Demographic Trends in Russia in Population and Family, in TiE Low CouNTRIEs
(H. Van Den Brekel & F. Deven eds., 1994); 2 SELECTED CURRENT IssuEs, EUROPEAN STUDIES OF
POPULATION 199 (1995).
29. C. FAM. art. 22.
30. See id.
31. Id.
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oncile." This provision is intended to ensure that parties undertake serious
contemplation before divorce, while preventing quick divorces due to minor
quarrels. After the three-month postponement, the court must dissolve the
marriage if one spouse still insists on divorce."
After examining Article 22(2), one can conclude that the consistent in-
tent of one of the spouses to terminate the marriage constitutes sufficient
proof of an irretrievable breakdown. Therefore, under the new Code, the
breakdown of a marriage is determined by subjective criteria rather than the
old objective standard. Under the old standard, the moving party had to con-
vince the judge; now, the criteria can be satisfied if one spouse remains con-
vinced that the marriage must end.
B. Marital Property
According to pre-revolutionary law, a husband and wife owned their
own property separately. Furthermore, a married woman could enter into any
civil transaction and freely dispose of her assets. After the Russian Revolu-
tion, the marital property regime initially stayed the same, and the property
of spouses remained totally separate. In 1926, a limited form of community
property, where all property acquired during marriage was considered com-
munity property, replaced the separate property regime.' This limited form
of community property has remained applicable and essentially unchanged
up to the present day."
Contrary to other parts of family law, property law was far from liberal.
All the rules that governed marital property were mandatory. Therefore,
spouses were not permitted to enter into contracts that could adopt different
marital property regimes even if the alternative regime was more suitable to
their individual needs. When a market economy was implemented, the obvi-
ous disadvantages of this completely inflexible system became more and
more apparent. Many complicated problems arose when a growing number
of citizens engaged in private business activity. These problems made the in-
troduction of marriage contracts one of the most urgent issues at the time of
drafting of the Civil and the Family Codes.
For the first time in Russian legislative history, general provisions on
marital property were placed in the Civil Code.3" The Family Code contains
more detailed rules of marital property and provides specific regulations
based on the particulars of family relations.
32. See id.
33. See id. art. 22(2) ("marriage shall be dissolved if attempts to reconcile spouses fail
and one of the spouses insists on divorce.").
34. See DMITRII M. GENKIN ET AL., ISTORIIA SOVETSKOGO GRAZHDANSKOGO PRAVA
1917-1947 433-40, (Yuridicheskaia Literatura, Moscow, 1949).
35. See MARIA V. ANTOKOLSKAIA, SEMEINOIE PRAVO 143-49 (1999).
36. See 1994 C. civ. art. 256.
2000]
7
Antokolskaia: The New Aspects of Russian Family Law
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2000
30 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31
The legal regime of matrimonial property is one of limited community
property. According to Article 256(2) of the Civil Code and Articles 33 and
34 of the Family Code, property acquired by the spouses during marriage is
considered to be a common asset.37 This property is jointly owned. Property
that is not community property consists of pre-marital property, as well as
property acquired during marriage by gift, inheritance, or some other cost-
free transaction, and items of individual use (except jewelry and other luxu-
ries). Article 38(4) of the Family Code authorizes the judge to grant the
status of separate property to assets that were acquired after separation of the
spouses but before all the divorce formalities were fulfilled.38
Community property is possessed, enjoyed, and disposed of with the
mutual consent of the spouses.39 If one of the spouses enters into a transac-
tion relating to community property, the other spouse's consent is presumed.
The transaction is voidable if, in reality, the other spouse did not consent and
the aggrieved spouse challenges the transaction in court. In order to protect
bona fide third parties, the court will only invalidate the transaction when it
is proven that the third party knew, or should have known, about the plaintiff
spouse's lack of consent.' The most valuable marital assets are provided
with special protection. In accordance with Article 35(3) of the Family
Code, when a transaction requires a notary form or involves marital real
property, the authenticated and notarized consent of both spouses is re-
quired."' If one spouse enters into such a transaction without the proper con-
sent, the aggrieved spouse has one year to challenge the transaction."
Community assets can be divided upon divorce or during the marriage.
When marital property is not divided until after the marriage is dissolved,
the general statutory limitation term of three years applies. Spouses can enter
into agreements to divide their property, or, if the parties cannot agree, the
court can order the division. In case of division by agreement, spouses can
divide property as they wish. If no agreement is reached and the matter must
be litigated, the shares of the spouses are considered equal, irrespective of
how much a particular spouse contributed to the acquisition of the property.
A spouse is entitled to an equal share even if he or she did not contribute to
the property acquisition at all. This is true if the non-acquiring spouse was
unemployed, running the household, rearing children, going to school, or be-
cause of sickness or other serious reasons. When the reasons for non-
contribution to the acquisition of property are not considered "serious"
enough, the share of the non-contributing spouse can be decreased. 3
37. See id. See also C. FAM. arts. 33-34.
38. See C. FAM. art. 38(4).
39. See id. art. 35(1).
40. See id. art. 35(3).
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. art. 30(2) (A reason is not considered "serious" where a spouse refuses to
work without sufficient reasons or wastes family assets by gambling or drinking.). See also
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For the first time in Russian history, the new Family Code allows
spouses to create a contractual regime of marital property by entering into a
marriage contract. The freedom to enter into a marriage contract is one of the
most important innovations of the Family Code, but regrettably, some of the
provisions related to it are far from perfect."
A marriage contract can be entered into at any time before or after a
marriage is solemnized. A marriage contract requires a notarized and authen-
ticated writing. If a contract was entered into before the celebration of mar-
riage, it comes into force at the time of registration of the marriage.
The Family Code allows spouses to establish any marital property re-
gime they wish through a marriage contract. A marriage contract can contain
various provisions with respect to property rights of the spouses as long as
they do not contradict the law. For instance, a contract can regulate support
during marriage or after divorce. Furthermore, a marriage contract can de-
termine how property should be distributed, if marital property must be di-
vided, and who will pay compensation. Moreover, marriage contracts can
change the status of previously acquired property with a retroactive effect.'
Despite these progressive features, the new law has a shortcoming in that it
does not provide possible contractual regime models. This omission can cre-
ate numerous problems in a country where notaries and spouses have no ex-
perience in entering into marriage contacts.
A spouse's discretion is not unlimited. A marriage contract must satisfy
the general requirements concerning form, legal capacity, and undue influ-
ence for civil transactions under the Civil Code. Additionally, the Family
Code contains specific limitations that affect the peculiarities of a marriage
contract.' A marriage contract cannot include provisions regarding minor
children. Furthermore, marriage contracts cannot restrict the right of a needy
or disabled spouse to make an alimony claim.
Following the tradition of most other European countries, a marriage
contract cannot govern personal non-property rights and duties."7 The reason
behind this limitation is the problematic enforcement of such provisions.
Spouses are, of course, free to make any arrangements they wish about eve-
ryday duties, like washing the dishes and putting out the cat, but such ar-
rangements are not legally enforceable.
The most problematic limitation on the contractual freedom of spouses
is formulated in Article 42(3) of the Family Code. According to this Article,
provisions that "place one of the spouses in an extremely unfavorable posi-
ANTOKOLSKAIA, supra note 35, at 152-53.
44. See id. arts. 42- 44.
45. See C. FAM. art. 42. An agreement to change the regime of property with a retroactive
effect is only possible when the agreement does not infringe upon the interests of creditors.
46. See id. art. 42(3).
47. See id.
2000]
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tion" can be declared invalid if the aggrieved spouse challenges the provi-
sion."
The problematic character of this limitation is in determining what is an
"extremely unfavorable position." 9 This determination is left to the discre-
tion of a judge, who is directed to consider all the circumstances of the case
at hand. This limitation was imposed out of concern for the possible abuse of
contractual freedom, facilitated by the special nature of the relations between
spouses, typified by feelings of love, trust, emotional attachment, and de-
pendency. An example could be an arrangement by which one of the spouses
totally renounces the right to acquire any property during marriage.
The limitations described above constitute the boundaries of contractual
freedom of the spouses. In cases where the court determines that Article
42(3) has been violated, the contract becomes void or voidable. A married
couple can alter or dissolve a marriage agreement by mutual consent at any
time. The requirement of a notary authentication must be fulfilled. Unilateral
termination of the contract is not possible, but, in case of substantial change
of circumstances, a spouse can petition the court to amend or terminate the
contract. Unfortunately, contrary to the initial intention of the drafters, this
procedure is governed by the restrictive rules of Article 451 of the Civil
Code, which, in reality, makes it almost impossible to alter or dissolve a
marriage contract in the event of changed circumstances."
The introduction of marriage contracts made it necessary to create pro-
visions that protect the interests of the creditors of the contracting spouses.
According to Article 46, spouses are obliged to inform their creditors about
the existence, amendment, or termination of a marriage contract. 1 If they fail
to do so, spouses remain liable to their creditors as if the marital property re-
gime remained unchanged. When the creditors are properly informed, and
the existence, amendment, or termination of the marriage contract substan-
tially infringes upon their rights, creditors are entitled to make a claim to
amend or terminate their own contract with the spouse or spouses, in accor-
dance with the provisions of the Civil Code.
C. Paternity Determination
In nineteenth-century Russia, illegitimate children were targets of dis-
crimination. Since before the Russian Revolution, this discrimination has
slowly diminished; however, it has never been completely overcome. The
first Family Code of 1918 granted children born out of wedlock equal rights.
The early Code also provided illegitimate children protection in other ways;
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See 1994C. civ. art. 451.
51. See C. FAM. art. 46.
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for instance, if a putative father refused to acknowledge paternity, the Code
gave the court the power to establish paternity by court decision.
Later, the concern for the interests of the child led to the creation of a
law that was notoriously one-sided. According to the Family Code of 1926, a
mother who lodged a paternity claim against a putative father did not have to
make a showing of proof because the burden of proof shifted to the putative
father to disprove paternity. The putative father had more than just the bur-
den of proof to overcome because judges were encouraged to establish pa-
ternity whenever possible." In 1944, family law was altered radically, and
the liberal paternity standards shifted to the opposite extreme. 3 According to
the Act of July 8,1944, paternity could not be voluntarily established nor
could the courts establish paternity by decision. The Code of 1969 restored
both institutions and tried to establish a certain balance between the interests
of children born out of wedlock and those of putative fathers.5"
According to the new Family Code, if a child is born within lawful mat-
rimony, the mother's husband is presumed to be its father.56 The husband,
the mother, or the child's natural father can contest this presumption. The
decision to allow a begetter of a child to establish a claim of his paternity,
for instance, on the basis of a genetic test, is likely unwise, particularly when
such a claim is against the will of the mother and her husband.57 Most often,
interference of this sort will not be in the best interests of the child nor the
adult parties.
52. An instruction letter from the Civil Department of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR
of June 11, 1929 stated, "every child must have a father in order to be able to claim alimony
from him." 14 SUDEBNAIA PRAKTIKA 192 (1929).
53. See Ukaz Prezidiuma, supra note 8.
54. See id.
55. See Kodeks Zakonov o Brake i Sem'ie RSFSR, supra note 9, arts. 47(3), 48.
56. See C. FAM. art. 48(4).
57. In a situation like this, an irreconcilable conflict between the interests of a mother
and her lawful husband, who are caring for a child and enjoying a "family life" with the child,
on the one hand, and the interests of the child's biological father, who typically does not have
any other links with the child except for the genetic ones, on the other hand, will arise. The
interests of a mother and her husband to continue family relations with the child undisturbed
will coincide with the best interests of the child in having stable family relations. Giving pri-
ority to the claim of a biological father would lead to severe disturbance of these relations and
have a negative psychological impact on the child. For this reason, such claims should be sat-
isfied only in exceptional cases when a judge is convinced that establishing a parental rela-
tionship with the biological father would serve the interest of the child, for instance, when a
biological father appears to be a much more suitable influence on the child than the lawful
husband of the mother, or when a biological father succeeds in proving that he has more than
mere genetic links with the child, either because of cohabiting with the child's mother during
a considerable period of time before the birth of the child or by participating in education or
maintenance of the child. There is no reason why someone who made a woman pregnant dur-
ing a "one-night stand" should be given more rights in respect to establishing his paternity
than a donor, whose paternity suit is not possible under the provisions of Article 51(3) of the
Family Code. See C. FAM. art. 51(3). The only difference between an aforementioned person
and a donor is that the former had sexual intercourse with the mother of the child and the lat-
ter did not; this does not seem sufficient to justify such a differentiation.
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Under the new Family Code, if the parents are not married, the father
can acknowledge paternity by filing an application with the mother at the
Department of Registration of Civil Acts."8 The parents do not have to wait
for childbirth; they can present the application during pregnancy.
If a putative father denies paternity, the mother, the guardian, or even
the child over the age of majority, can file a claim before the court. The puta-
tive father can also petition to have his paternity established in court if the
mother refuses to acknowledge the Department of Registration of Civil Acts
application. According to Article 49, any evidence that undoubtedly proves
paternity is sufficient.59 In difficult cases, the court can rely on genetic exper-
tise.
When in-vitro fertilization or other means of human-assisted reproduc-
tion results in childbirth, the female who gave birth to the child is registered
as its mother and her husband as its father, provided that the husband gave
written consent for the assisted reproduction treatment. 60 The couple is con-
clusively presumed to be the child's parents and cannot contest parenthood
in the future by relying on the fact that the birth was the result of assisted re-
production treatment. The establishment of the paternity or the maternity of
the donors, or even the disclosure of their names, is not allowed. 6' This pro-
hibition remains in the Code to protect the social parents and the child itself
from disclosure of information about the biological origins of the child. Do-
nors as well want to be certain that they will not be subjected to disturbance
and complications.
Although these are valid motives, this is an old-fashioned approach that
leaves no room for discretion, and, therefore, is not favorable. Sometimes
discretion is necessary to disclose the biological origins of a child for identi-
fication and treatment of inherited diseases. Also, the child can have a strong
desire to know its biological parents. A better solution would have been to
allow the court to order the disclosure of a child's biological origin informa-
tion if the child presents a claim and a compelling argument for such disclo-
sure.
The most complicated problem in the field of establishment of the par-
enthood of a child is created by the phenomenon of surrogate motherhood. It
was a great advantage for the Russian drafters that they could benefit from
the experience of the United States and some European countries when ad-
dressing this complicated issue. The new Family Code gives priority to the
interests of the surrogate mother, who is given a chance to "change her
mind."'62 After the birth of a child, the surrogate mother has two options: she
58. See C. FAM. art. 48(4).
59. See id. art. 49.
60. See id.
61. The same protection is provided to the confidentiality of adoption. Any private per-
son or official, who reveals information about adoption against the will of the adoptive par-
ents, can be prosecuted criminally.
62. C. FAM. art. 51(4).
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can confirm her consent given before the implantation of the embryo and
hand the child over to the couple with whom she contracted, or withhold her
consent and register herself as the mother. 3
Once the mother confirms her consent, it becomes irrevocable, and once
the couple is registered as the parents, the registration cannot be challenged
in the future. The surrogate mother is given the option to change her mind
because childbirth can result in a tremendous psychological impact that
arouses the feelings and instincts of motherhood. Moreover, before child-
birth, a surrogate mother is only aware of the absence of a genetic link on a
rational level, and severe trauma may result if a mother is required to hand a
child over after giving birth.
This brief discussion of this part of Russian family law reveals a trend
that moves away from defining parenthood as a relationship based on bio-
logical links, and a trend towards defining parenthood more as a social rela-
tionship. In cases of human-assisted reproduction and paternity recognition
by non-biological fathers, the law gives priority to those who intend to create
parental relations with the children and declares them lawful parents in spite
of the absence of genetic links.
D. Parental Rights
Russian law prior to the Russian Revolution granted parents strong pa-
rental authority, not only with respect to minor children, but also with re-
spect to their adult children." The development of parental rights after the
Russian Revolution was rather contradictory. On one hand, both parents ac-
quired equal legal rights with respect to their children. On the other hand,
parental functions were considered mainly societal duties.
The rules regulating parental responsibility necessarily contain a signifi-
cant public element because of the legal position of minors who cannot as-
sert their rights themselves. The new Family Code defines a sphere of pri-
vate discretion by stating that parents are free to choose how to exercise their
parental rights with respect to the upbringing and education of their chil-
dren. Parental discretion must be based on mutual consent and take into
consideration the wishes of the children. Article 65 of the new Family Code
limits parental discretion by stating that parents should not cause any harm
to the physical, psychological, or moral development of their children.'
When Article 65 is violated, the State will limit the parents' discretion and
utilize special public bodies to exercise control for the well-being of the
child.67
63. See id.
64. See Svod Zakonov Grazhdanskikh, arts. 161-68; 10 SVOD ZAKONOV RossnsKoY
IMPERIL ZAKONY GRAZHDANSKIE, Part 1 (1916).
65. See C. FAM. art. 65(1).
66. See id. art. 65.
67. Typically, the Guardianship and Curatorship Department.
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Under the new Family Code, both parents are given equal parental au-
thority whether or not they are married, whether or not they are living to-
gether with the child, and whether paternity was acknowledged voluntarily
or established by court decision. 8 This approach is in line with Article 18 of
the Child Convention.' Although many people view this rule in a favorable
light, in practice, this rule is troublesome because it grants full parental re-
sponsibility to some parents who have no desire to establish relations with
their child.
The court can determine paternity with genetic testing, but it cannot cre-
ate and enforce beneficial social relations. As a result, a truly reluctant par-
ent does nothing at best, and at worst, will abuse the parental authority
granted to such parent. For instance, a reluctant parent who is forced to as-
sume responsibilities for a child can arbitrarily refuse to give parental con-
sent where it is needed, even for trivial things like taking the child abroad for
the holidays. The only way a court can protect a child from such problems is
to terminate or restrict the rights of a reluctant parent by court decision. Per-
haps the best solution would be not to grant such rights to parents who are
reluctant to assume any parental responsibility.
Another problematic situation arises when one of the parents is not liv-
ing with the child but still wants to take part in the child's upbringing and
education. From the legal point of view, both the mother and the father have
completely equal rights in these areas. When parents are separated, however,
judges place children with the mother in most cases. Although the father en-
joys equal rights on paper, in reality, he cannot even exercise his visitation
rights without the mother's cooperation. This situation has already generated
considerable social tension. Fathers, frustrated because they cannot exercise
their parental rights, have founded an organization that strives for equal
treatment." In an attempt to tackle this problem, the new Family Code gives
the court power to transfer child custody from the mother to the father in
cases where the mother grossly disobeys the court and refuses to let the fa-
ther exercise his rights.7 It remains, however, very questionable whether the
law can solve such problems completely.
E. Rights of Minors
Chapter 11 of the new Family Code contains special rules regarding the
rights of minor children.72 This is a novelty for Russia. Before the new Code,
minor children were perceived mainly as passive subjects of parental care.
68. See C. FAM. art. 61(1).
69. See Child Convention, supra note 5, art. 18.
70. A Group for Equal Treatment of Divorced Fathers. The organization is not formally
registered and does not have an official name.
71. See C. FAM. art. 66(3).
72. See id. ch. 11.
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The Child Convention was the inspiration for the new rules.73 An important
right of a child is the right to express his or her opinion. The Russian legisla-
tion follows the Child Convention by not mentioning a minimum age for this
right. Therefore, a Russian child has the right to express its opinion in re-
gards to any family decision that touches the child's interests as soon as the
child is able to formulate an opinion. The child has the same right in any
administrative or court procedure. The age of the child is only relevant when
it comes to the evaluation of the child's opinion.
The Child Convention considers a child's opinion in light of the child's
ability to formulate such an opinion.74 Article 57 of the Family Code pro-
vides that if a child is ten years old, the child's opinion must be considered.75
A child that has not reached the age of ten also must be given the opportu-
nity to be heard; however, the parents and officials are not obliged to follow
the child's opinion. If a child is ten years old and the child's opinion is not
followed, those who disregard the child's opinion must sufficiently explain
their motivation. When, for example, a child has expressed his wish to stay
with the father after divorce, a judge who finds it better for the child to stay
with the mother will have to clarify why overruling the child's preference
would be in the child's best interest.
Certain decisions cannot be made against the will of a child ten years
old or older. A child ten years old or older must consent if the child's first
name or family name is to be changed, if adoption is to be established, if
adoptive parents are to be registered as natural parents, or if the child is to be
placed with foster parents.' The child's consent is required in these circum-
stances because the child's most serious interests are involved. For instance,
a child cannot be renamed without its consent because a name is one of the
most important features that gives a person an identity. Moreover, the resto-
ration of parental rights, adoption, and placement with foster parents all en-
tail a complete change of the living conditions of the child, which is also
why these actions cannot be taken without the child's explicit consent.
A child has the right to keep contact with his or her parents and other
family members, particularly in divorce cases. A child can also refuse such
contact, forcing us to look at visitation rights from a completely different
perspective, from the point of view of the child instead of the disagreeing
parents.
The new Family Code also grants children the right to protect them-
selves against their parents, or others, in cases of abuse.77 Children of any
age can seek protection in the Department of Guardianship and Curatorship
at their own initiative. At the age of fourteen, a child is allowed to lodge his
73. See generally Child Convention, supra note 5, which considers a child as a person
bearing his own independent rights.
74. See id. art.12.
75. SeeC. FAM. art. 57.
76. See id. arts. 59(4), 132, 134(4), 154(3).
77. See id. art. 56(3).
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or her own action directly before the court and to initiate a procedure of ter-
mination or limitation of parental rights against abusive parents.
IV. CONCLUSION
The new Family Code can be viewed as the product of the contradictory
history of Russian family law, and, also, as a new link in the chain of Euro-
pean family law. Russian lawyers had a good starting point in the beginning
of the twentieth century when family law was modernized. They have dealt
with the significant positive and negative experiences that resulted in dra-
matic changes to legislation and family law approaches. When the new Fam-
ily Code emerged in the middle of the 1990s, the drafters of the Code were
able to build on comparative research and to benefit from the experience of
other countries. Because of this, it is expected that the new Russian Family
Code can give Western lawyers some food for thought.
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